đź§ Active Directory - SeBackupPrivilege Abuse
What is it?
- Concept:
SeBackupPrivilegelets its holder read any file on disk regardless of ACLs (so backup software can copy locked/protected system files without needing full Administrator rights) — including the registry hives (SAM,SYSTEM) that hold local account password hashes. - Impact: Local privilege escalation to Administrator/SYSTEM by dumping and pass-the-hashing (or cracking) the local Administrator’s NTLM hash straight out of the registry hives.
How it works
Windows normally protects the live SAM/SYSTEM registry hives from being read directly — they’re locked by the OS while it’s running. SeBackupPrivilege bypasses the usual ACL/lock checks specifically so backup agents can still capture a consistent copy of protected files, and the same override applies to reg save against the registry hives. Since the SAM hive’s data is encrypted with a key derived from the SYSTEM hive, both need to be pulled together; once local, a tool like secretsdump can decrypt them completely offline, no interaction with the live host required beyond the initial read.
Exploitation
Prerequisites
- Code execution as an account with
SeBackupPrivilegeenabled — check withwhoami /priv
Attack Vectors
reg save HKLM\SAM .\sam
reg save HKLM\SYSTEM .\system
# then transfer both files off the target (e.g. evil-winrm's `download`)impacket-secretsdump -sam sam -system system LOCALNotes
- The recovered hash is the local Administrator account’s, not a domain account’s — still enough for full control of the box via pass-the-hash, since it’s typically also a local admin.
SeRestorePrivilege(often granted alongsideSeBackupPrivilege) is a related but separate abuse path — it allows writing files regardless of ACLs, which opens up options like overwriting a service binary or DLL instead of just reading secrets.
Mitigation
- Fix: Only grant
SeBackupPrivilege/SeRestorePrivilegeto dedicated, tightly-controlled backup service accounts — never to a regular user or a broad group.
Related Usage
| File | Created |
|---|---|
| HTB - Cicada | Tuesday, July 21st 2026, 2:55:20 am |
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